Gunships poised for battle, but risks may keep them grounded
By David Abel | The Boston Globe | 5/22/1999
WASHINGTON - If used in Yugoslavia the way military planners envision,a team of Apache attack helicopters might fly into the wake of raining rockets and promptly pick off scattering tanks, troop carriers, and other enemy targets.
Or they might slip across the Albanian border on a moonless night to strafe arms depots or antiaircraft batteries.
The vaunted gunships also could be used as no-frills patrol cops, as they've been employed in Bosnia, hovering near hot spots of violence and intimately signaling to troublemakers on the ground that there is a higher authority.
But the 24 AH-64A Apaches poised for battle just across the border between Yugoslavia and Albania may not even test-fire their armor-piercing weapons, let alone cross into enemy territory, officials say.
The reason: The copters, which cost $14 million each, would be vulnerable to attack by the thousands of dispersed Serbian soldiers on the ground, hundreds of whom may be carrying shoulder-fired missiles. Before deploying them, a strategic calculation has to be made about whether the risks of use are worth the benefits.
"They are ready and capable to go," said Major Joseph Harrington, an Army spokesman at the Pentagon. "But a political decision must be made before they are used. And we have not received such a decision."
President Clinton has acknowledged that the Apaches might not be used. Other aircraft, including the Air Force's more resilient A-10 Warthogs and special operations AC-130 Spectre gunships, could do the same work with less risk, he said.
Echoing statements from the Pentagon, Clinton told reporters that improving weather made it less necessary to utilize the Apaches, which fly below clouds and can operate in rain or snow.
The increasing doubt that political leaders will launch the Apaches, which together with at least 5,000 Army troops took more than a month to deploy to their makeshift muddy base in Albania, has prompted some military analysts to question whether the Pentagon ever planned to use them.
"One has to wonder if they weren't just intended . . . for psychological reasons," said Dan Goure, deputy director of political-military studies at Washington's Center for Strategic and International Studies. "They may be the equivalent of the Marine brigade stationed off the Kuwaiti coast during the Gulf War, which threatened to tie down Iraqi troops in an amphibious assault."
Goure and other military analysts said that, given the amount of time it took the Apaches to prepare for combat, it seems odd that the Pentagon didn't transport the newer, more powerful version of the aircraft, the AH-64D Longbows, from the United States.
The next-generation Apaches improve on the agile and deadly helicopters, already considered the world's most capable. The older version, which began rolling off McDonnell Douglas assembly lines in 1984, carries 16 antitank Hellfire missiles, 76 folding antipersonnel rockets, and 1,200 rounds of 30mm armor-piercing ammunition.
Still, the Apaches in Albania, which flew in from bases in Germany, are anything but featherweights. They received nearly universal praise for their service in the Gulf War, having emerged virtually unscathed after destroying more than 500 Iraqi tanks, hundreds of armored troop carriers and military vehicles, and key early warning radar sites.
With two of the initial 24 Apaches having already crashed, in one case killing the helicopter's two-man crew, Pentagon officials have little appetite for further casualties.
Despite the millions of dollars required to move them and to set up Task Force Hawk in Albania, Pentagon officials and analysts now say the Apaches would be flying unorthodox missions by attacking Serbian forces.
They argue the Apaches weren't meant to fly solo missions deep into enemy territory, although they did during the Gulf War, having fired the first shots of the air campaign against Iraqi radar installations. They were designed to take out Soviet tanks rolling across central Germany, working closely with ground forces, Army officials say.
Analysts argue that the Apaches are highly versatile and are not limited to one mission. Nevertheless, they agree it is unwise to risk them at this point in the air war over Yugoslavia.
"We're in a war of attrition, just plinking targets until there's nothing left to plink," Goure said. "We can do this just as well from high up with jets."
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Ungainly jet earns honors for effectiveness
By David Abel | The Boston Globe | 5/20/1999
WASHINGTON -- A decade ago, the US Air Force's A-10 Thunderbolt, better known as the "Warthog" for its noted resemblance to the brawny beast, was one of the military's many pricey programs slated for extinction.
The titanium-armored flying "tank-buster" was considered expendable in light of looming budget cuts at the end of the Cold War.
Pentagon officials said other aircraft, including the Army's Apache attack helicopter, could fill the role.
But that was before the Warthog earned its reputation in the Gulf War as one of the Air Force's most potent and reliable weapons. Now, with the military reluctant to risk the nearly $14 million Apaches, the less expensive jets have taken a leading role in pummeling Yugoslavia's forces.
"When the weather is good, as it generally is at this time of year, most of what the Apaches could do can be done by the A-10s at less risk," President Clinton told reporters this week. The Pentagon previously had announced that it was sending 18 additional Warthogs to Italy from Air National Guard units, including the 104th Fighter Wing at Barnes Municipal Airport in Westfield.
The ground-attack A-10s, which cost nearly $9 million a copy, were conceived in the midst of the Vietnam War. Military planners noted the need for a powerful plane that could loiter low around a target, evade and sustain hits from enemy fire, and unload a significant arsenal. The initial mission, which has evolved over the years, was to aid ground troops engaged in battle or clear a zone for soldiers to occupy.
The first of more than 700 Thunderbolts rolled off the assembly lines of Fairchild Republic Co., in Farmingdale, Long Island, in 1975. The Warthog earned its nickname after an Air Force major described it in a journal as "an ugly beast with a thick hide and dangerous tusks."
The jets were designed to pack and to withstand a punch. They carry up to 16,000 pounds of bombs and missiles and enough ammunition to fire 3,900 bullets a minute from a 300-mm Gatling cannon mounted under the plane's pointy snout.
The A-10 was built to survive direct hits from powerful, armor-piercing shells. The jet's skin is coated in flak-resistant titanium, its fuel cells are protected with a special foam and its pilots can fly even if the hydraulic power gets knocked out.
Today, about 360 active and reserve Warthogs are in service. Pentagon officials would not say how many are taking part in the air war over Yugoslavia.
"It wasn't until the Gulf War, when the A-10s did better than expected, that the Air Force decided not to get rid of them," said Michael O'Hanlon, a military specialist at the Brookings Institution, a Washington think tank.
The jets flew 8,100 missions during the Gulf War, officials said, destroying more than 50 percent of Iraq's military equipment. Using depleted uranium bullets, which some critics said may have caused the symptoms known as Gulf War Syndrome, pilots pierced the armor of Iraq's Soviet-made tanks as if they were tin cans.
Until the first week of May, NATO restricted the Warthogs to mostly spotting missions at high altitudes over Yugoslavia. Since then, however, they have played an increasing role as the alliance has intensified its strikes.
"The A-10s may be able to do the work that the Apaches were sent there to do," the Pentagon spokesman, Ken Bacon, said at a briefing Tuesday.
Bacon said there are two reasons why the Pentagon has favored the continued use of Warthogs over Apaches. First, the weather has improved, he said. The Pentagon sent the Apaches to strike targets beneath a stubborn canopy of clouds that has hampered the air campaign since it began. But with better weather, NATO can attack from a higher altitude, which reduces the risk for NATO crews, Bacon said. Second, the allies have heavily damaged Yugoslavia's air defense system, making it easier to use the Warthogs, he said.
With at least 650 US aircraft committed to NATO's air campaign, the resilient Warthogs have proved capable of taking on missions few other jets, or the Apaches, would risk.
Swooping low, often through dense pockets of antiaircraft fire, the awkward-looking A-10s have attacked scores of tanks, armored personnel carriers and any other Serbian targets.
"The A-10s get the job done," O'Hanlon said. "There's less political risk if one gets shot down. That might not be acceptable with the Apaches, given all the hoopla."
By David Abel | The Sun-Sentinel | 5/1/1999
WASHINGTON -- The Kosovo crisis, this year's military pullout from Panama and the post-cold-war downsizing of the armed forces are hampering America's ability to monitor the byways traffickers use to ferry drugs into the United States, the commander-in-chief of the Miami-based U.S. Southern Command testified before Congress.
"The continuing erosion of the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets available to Southcom is compromising our ability to concentrate limited resources at the decisive time and place," Gen. Charles Wilhelm told the Senate Armed Services Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee this week. "I'm not sure there is enough to go around even if we were in a normal cycle."
Before the Kosovo bombing began in late March, the Pentagon had "a flexible and comprehensive air and maritime detection and monitoring capability" covering transit zones from South America to the U.S. border, the deputy assistant secretary of defense for special operations, Brian Sheridan, told the panel.
While the number of resources removed from the area to supplement operations in Kosovo is classified, Wilhelm and Pentagon officials acknowledge continuous air surveillance provided by AWACS surveillance planes, strategic airlift capacity and a smattering of intelligence experts have been reduced.
"If you look around, all the CINCs (commanders-in-chiefs) have been stripped of certain items for Kosovo," Wilhelm said. "There were already 118 CINC-identified readiness-related deficiencies. Kosovo has exacerbated the problem."
Despite the military's $ 982 million anti-drug budget for fiscal 1999, officials who oversee the military's role in fighting drugs say the United States now has less than 50 percent of the personnel and equipment it employed in the region before 1990.
Normally, Southcom says, it can cover 50 percent of the region 50 percent of the time. With the Kosovo commitment, Wilhelm estimated the military can only monitor 15 percent of the drug-running corridor only 15 percent of the time.
Senior Pentagon officials say the Kosovo conflict has a negligible effect on the drug war. They argue the military, which plays only a supporting role in fighting drug traffickers, is deep enough to deal with multiple campaigns.
"There will be some diversion," said one senior Pentagon official who oversees the military's anti-drug efforts. "Does it affect the overall policy? No. It may no longer take three days to get something accomplished. It may now take two weeks. But it will get accomplished."
Increasing the difficulty of dealing with fewer resources is the confusion that comes with a reorganized Southcom. The 1977 Torrijos-Carter treaty obliges the United States to remove all its forces from Panama by Dec. 31. Critical elements of the military's anti-drug forces are being dispersed throughout Latin America.
All air operations will end today at Howard Air Force Base in Panama. Anti-drug sorties will be directed from Southcom's new headquarters in Miami, with flights hailing from new bases in Manta, Ecuador; Aruba and Curacao in the Netherlands Antilles; and established bases in Puerto Rico and Key West, officials said.
Yet U.S. officials have yet to secure the long-term use of the bases. The United States has limited one-year agreements to operate in Aruba and Curacao, and each will require heavy investments -- beyond the budgeted $ 45 million, officials say -- to support the type of missions carried out from Panama.
Michael Vigil, head of the Drug Enforcement Administration in Puerto Rico, one of the most active transshipment points for drug traffickers in the Caribbean, said he's yet to feel the effect of the Kosovo crisis.
"I think it's a little too early to gauge the impact," Vigil said. "We haven't faced a major dilemma with a massive increase in illicit activities. But this may happen in the next few weeks."
Sitting ramrod in his Marine greens before subcommittee chairman Pat Roberts, Wilhelm explained how the tricky game of combating smugglers with limited resources is becoming increasingly difficult.
"The keys to success are flexible and agile operations based on timely and accurate intelligence," Wilhelm said. "This is emerging as our Achilles heel."
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